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ZONING-RURAL AMERICA:
A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?
Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton
(1st Cir. 1972)
The population explosion in America, combined with the con-
tinued deterioration of its cities,' has led to a migration of Ameri-
cans from the cities to the suburbs during the past decade. These
migrants brought to suburbia the very discomforts they had hoped
to escape by their exodus from the cities, namely: congestion,
pollution, crime and noise. Partially due to this, but mainly due
to the attractions our natural environment offers, a second migra-
tion is now taking place; this is the flight of Americans in subur-
bia to the small rural communities.
2
Inhabitants of many of these small communities have met this
prospect of increased population and its accompanying effects
with determined resistance.3 Desiring to preserve the small rural
atmosphere of their communities 4 by maintaining a low density
of population, the residents have attempted to utilize minimum lot
size zoning as a shield against the advancing urban sprawl.5
The residents of these small communities have a justifiable right
to maintain a safe and pleasant place to live. This right was re-
cently acknowledged in Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton0 where the United States District Court in New Hamp-
shire in upholding a six-acre minimum lot size requirement stated:
1. REPoRT Or THE CoiAIissIoN ON THE CITIES IN THE '70's, THE STATE Or
THE CIEs (1970).
2. See Note, Protection of Environmental Quality in Non Metropolitan
Regions by Limiting Development, 57 IowA L. REv. 126 (1971).
3. 2 R. ANDERSON, AMEmcAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.47 (1968).
4. Other considerations prevail in addition to the desire to maintain
the rustic value of the community. For example, insuring adequate water
and air, preserving property values and to prevent burdening municipal
facilities such as police and fire protection are additional objectives a
community hopes to achieve by maintaining a low population density
level. Id.
5. Id.
6. 338 F. Supp. 301 (D. N.H. 1972).
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The people of Sanbornton have a right to try to protect themselves
against the ugly suburban sprawl that has become part of the
great megalopolis running from Washington, D.C. to Portland,
Maine.7
Nevertheless, this right is not absolute. By preserving the pleas-
ant atmosphere of their surroundings with restrictions on their
population growth, these small communities infringe upon the
rights of others to seek a more comfortable place to live. These
conflicting rights have been a source of constant litigation in cases
involving zoning regulations.
Ever since the Supreme Court of the United States decided Eu-
clid v. Ambler,8 zoning regulations have been sustained if they were
reasonable and had a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." In Steel Hill Development,
Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), the First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's findings that
a six-acre minimum lot size requirement ° did relate substantially
to the general welfare of the community and was therefore valid.
Steel Hill Development Company [hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff] purchased 510 acres in and around the town of Sanborn-
ton, New Hampshire in 1969. At the date of purchase, the land was
zoned so as to require a minimum lot size of 35,000 square feet1 1
per dwelling. In 1971, following submission of development plans
by plaintiff to the town, seventy per cent of the plaintiff's property
was rezoned so as to require a minimum lot size of six acres per
dwelling. Plaintiff had contemplated utilizing the land for a clus-
ter type development; 12 and had received tentative favorable
consideration, but its plan was rendered impossible by the new
zoning regulations. Plaintiff filed suit in the Federal District
Court challenging the new regulations on the grounds that they
did not substantially relate to the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community, and that the rezoning thus constituted
a taking of property without compensation. The District Court
upheld the rezoning as did the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
7. Id. at 306.
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Note the court's use of the term "general welfare" in the disjunctive
in relation to health and safety; thereby inferring that general welfare could
exist apart from the other two as a valid zoning objective. Id. at 395.
10. To date this is the largest minimum lot size in a residential zone
that has been sustained by a court.
11. 43,560 square feet constitute one acre.
12. A cluster development is one where the developer "clusters" houses
together in order to have more open space for parks and other facilities.
See 1 E. YoELEY, ZoNING LAW AND PRncTcE (3d ed. 1965).
[voL. 10: 887, 1973] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
reiterating the finding that the fact that the zoning promoted the
general welfare made it sustainable even if it did not promote the
public health and safety in a traditional sense:18
The district court stated that it could not find the six acre require-
ment reasonable if only health and safety were considered, but
that such requirement was reasonably related to the promotion of
the general welfare of the community. 14
Smaller lot size restrictions can and have been upheld on the
grounds that they promoted the public health and safety along
with the general welfare "by insuring adequate light and air and
by reducing the danger of the spread of fire."15 When the lot area
requirements become so large that they no longer reasonably
relate to the promotion of the health and safety of the commun-
ity, another basis must be found to support their validity.
It would seem that lot minimums beyond one acre can only be jus-
tified on the ground that they contribute to the general welfare.
* • 16
As in Steel Hill, courts, recognizing general welfare as a separate
objective of zoning, have begun to uphold minimum area require-
ments if they substantially promote the general welfare of a com-
munity in the absence of a showing that they are essential to the
public health and safety."7 This trend of reliance upon general
welfare alone,1 8 suggests the expansion of the police power within
its constitutional limits' 9 so as to permit these rural communities
to preserve their character by excluding would-be citizens
through enactment of these large minimum lot size requirements.
Since this large lot zoning is being upheld as promoting the general
13. Traditionally, the concept of health, safety and welfare was associ-
ated with providing fire and police protection, adequate light and air and
prevention of congestion in the streets. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
14. 469 F.2d at 960.
15. R. ANDERSON, supra note 3.
16. Cunningham, Land Use Control-The State and Local Problems, 50
IowA L. REV. 367, 389 (1965) (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Bilbar Construction Company v. Board of Adjustment of
Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 74, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958). In upholding a
one-acre minimum lot size, the court admitted: "We ourselves have a
number of times upheld the constitutionality of zoning ordinances which
bore no reasonable relation to the health, safety, or morals of the com-
munity but whose constitutional validity rested alone upon their promotion
of the general welfare."
18. 1 C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AD PLANNING §§ 2-13 (1972).
19. See supra note 2, at 135.
welfare, even though not essential to the public health and safety,
the general welfare of a community must be separate from the
promotion of health and safety of its citizens.
As many zoning restrictions relate to the police power through
their tendency to promote these arguably peripheral interests,
the development of zoning as an efficient instrument depends
upon judicial recognition of "general welfare" as an objective
equal to and separate from "health, safety, and morals."2 0
It is safe to conclude that any promotion of the health and
safety of a community includes therein the promotion of the gen-
eral welfare, while the promotion of the general welfare does not
always advance the health and safety of the community's citizens.
The term "general welfare," however, as it relates to zoning re-
mains largely undefined.
21
The scope of this paper will be twofold: to define "general wel-
fare" as it relates to minimum lot size zoning and to determine
the impact of Steel Hill in regard to the right of a rural community
to preserve its rustic character.
22
MfnnuM LOT SIZES AND THE "GENmAL WELFAR"
The Supreme Court of the United States has termed the concept
of general welfare as broad and inclusive, representing spiritual,
physical, aesthetic and monetary considerations. 23 Only by analy-
sis of the cases and thereby ascertaining what the courts deter-
mined promoted the general welfare, and how they dealt with the
20. 1 R. ANDERsON, supra note 3 § 7.12, at 495.
21. Cunningham, supra note 16. One commentator advances the idea
that this very reason (vagueness of the term general welfare) is why
courts have upheld large minimum lot sizes when to do so imposes hard-
ships upon the individual property owners. His reasoning is that if the
court is unsure of the objectives that the particular zoning is attempting to
achieve, it cannot effectively evaluate these benefits to the community in
order to balance these benefits against the financial hardships to the in-
dividual land owners. The presumption of reasonableness of zoning regu-
lations affords the benefit of the doubt to the town. Kusler, Open Space
Zoning: Valid Regulation Or Invalid Taking, 57 MImN. L. REV. 1, 60 (1972).
22. Beyond the scope of this comment is the discussion of the constitu-
tional aspects of minimum lot size zoning. For a discussion of exclusion-
ary zoning and the right to vote, see: Note, The Constitutionality of Local
Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970); for a discussion concerning civil rights
and minimum lot zoning, see: Woodroof, Land Use Control and Population
Distribution in America, 23 HAST. L.J. 1427 (1972); and see Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969), for a discussion concerning the equal protec-
tion aspect of minimum lot size restrictions.
23. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). This case did concern the
power of eminent domain rather than power to zone; however, the idea is
the same.
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term in relation to health and safety, can we arrive at a definition
of general welfare as it relates to minimum lot size zoning.
In the first case upholding a minimum lot size requirement,
Simon v. Town of Needham,24 the court upheld an ordinance re-
quiring one acre lots and enumerated certain advantages that would
result from living upon a large lot. Among these advantages were
better facilities for children to play on and the freedom from traf-
fic and noise. Safer play areas for children are embraced within
the objective of safety while the absence of noise and traffic would
promote health (cleaner air) and safety (fewer automobile ac-
cidents). Of course, the attainment of these goals would also pro-
mote the general welfare of the community along with the health
and safety. However, the court also mentioned inducement to
beautify the surroundings as another advantage of living on a large
lot.2 This would clearly be classified as one of the intangible ob-
jectives of general welfare, but the Simon court did not have to
utilize general welfare as a separate objective since the lot re-
quirement was sustainable on health and safety grounds.
Considering the benefits listed in Simon, a later Massachusetts
case, Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 2 still ruled that a 100,000 square
foot restriction was unreasonable. The town of Sharon argued
that preservation of the town as a rural and recreational area was
fundamental to the mental and physical health of its inhabitants.
The court agreed that preservation of the community's rural atmos-
phere might contribute to the welfare of the inhabitants, but said
that this factor was outweighed by the hardships placed on the indi-
vidual property owner.2 7  Obviously, this court could evaluate
the objectives of the lot requirement and balance them against
the financial hardships to the individual land owners.
28
Ten years after the holding in Simon, a five-acre minimum lot
size requirement was sustained in the New Jersey case of Fischer
v. Bedminster,29 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied
24. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
25. Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
26. 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964).
27. "As applied to petitioner's property, the attainment of such advan-
tages does not reasonably require lots of 100,000 square feet." Id. at 604,
195 N.E.2d at 345.
28. See note 21, supra.
29. 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
the following test of validity:
[S]o long as the zoning ordinance was reasonably designed, by
whatever means, to further the advancement of a community as a
social, economic, and political unit, it is in the general welfare
and therefore a proper exercise of the police power.80
The Fischer court decided that preservation of the rural character
of a community was a valid objective of zoning, and thus implied
that this promoted the general welfare. 31 In view of the Fischer
court's test of validity, preservation of the rural character must
then advance the community as a social, economic and political
unit.
A recent New Jersey case, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison,3 2 invalidated one and two acre lot restrictions, distin-
guishing Fischer with the rationale that, since the restrictions in
the Oakwood case applied mainly to vacant land, there was no resi-
dential character to preserve.3 3  Even while invalidating the lot
size requirements, the court impliedly approved preservation of
the rural or residential character of a community as a valid ob-
jective of zoning embraced within the concept of promotion of the
general welfare.3 4
Adding a slight variation to minimum lot size cases was Gignoux
v. Village of Kings Point,85 which continued to hold that preserva-
tion of the rural character of a community tends to promote the
general welfare. The court decided that the comfort and happiness
of the people of the community was promoted by the town's ru-
ral character, and the occupants' well-being was an objective that
was contained within the term "general welfare."3 6
This proposition has, however, not received judicial unanimity.
In Kavanewsky v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Warren,
3 7
where a two-acre minimum lot size was voided, the Connecticut
Supreme Court ruled that the desire to maintain a community's
rural character was not a valid zoning objective since it does not
promote the general welfare.
A second component of general welfare stressed by the court in
Fischer was the economic status of a community's residents. 8
30. Id. at 203, 93 A.2d at 382.
31. Id. at 205, 93 A.2d at 384.
32. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971).
33. Id. at 15, 283 A.2d at 357.
34. Id.
35. 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950).
36. Id. at 491, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
37. 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971).
38. 11 N.J. at 205, 93 A.2d at 384.
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The question then becomes one of determining whether maintain-
ing the rural character with large lot size requirements advances
the citizens economically. One answer is that by maintaining a
low density of population, fewer people require fewer public
facilities such as schools, parks and police. It follows that mini-
mal public facilities will result in a smaller tax bill to the commun-
ity's residents.39 Another economic aspect that minimum lot size
zoning relates to is the conservation of property values in a com-
munity.
Of tremendous concern to all property owners is the preserva-
tion of their land's value. It is one of the primary reasons why these
small communities place these barriers (minimum lot size zoning)
up against intensive residential development. 40 The feared evil is
that intrusion of small lots into an area of larger ones would tend
to lower existing values.41 It is also thought that the overall ap-
pearance of a community tends to enhance the value of the indi-
vidual land owner's property.42 This objective bears no relation
to the health or safety of a community's citizens; the courts have,
however, determined that preservation of the property values does
promote the general welfare.
In a 1972 case, City of Jackson v. Ridgway,43 the court would not
allow lots smaller than 16,000 square feet, for to do so would al-
low purchasers of unsubdivided land to affect adversely the values
of existing homes at their own discretion.4 4 In Flora Realty & In-
vest. Co. v. City of Ladue,45 the Supreme Court of Missouri, up-
holding a three-acre minimum lot size requirement, stressed the
community's interest in the preservation of the local property val-
ues.46 Thus, it can be seen that minimum lot size zoning furthers
the general "economic" welfare of a community by increasing the
39. Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, 1969
WASH. U. L.Q. 263.
40. Id. at 308.
41. For an interesting discussion concerning the credibility of this theory
see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
42. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 7.19.
43. - Miss. -, 258 So. 2d 439 (1972).
44. Id. at 443.
45. 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S.
802 (1952).
46. Id. at 1036, 246 S.W.2d at 776.
total wealth of a community through either increasing or main-
taining property values.
The majority of the cases thus far examined point out that a rural
atmosphere is beneficial to a community's residents, and anything
beneficial can be said to promote the general welfare. It has also
been shown that preservation of the locality's property values is
also encompassed within the term general welfare. Of course, the
preservation of a community's rural character, assuming it is
not a deteriorated area, would preserve its property values. 47 How-
ever, the latter is not always a requirement of the former's validity
as the Gignoux case points out. The comfort and happiness of a
community's citizens is a general welfare goal in itself and a rural
atmosphere does serve to accomplish this. These cases seem to
suggest that rural character and protection of property values
are at least two components of general welfare where minimum
lot size zoning is concerned.
This paper now turns to Steel Hill and three other recent cases to
determine if a new definitional concept of general welfare as it
relates to minimum lot size zoning is emerging and to determine
the impact of Steel Hill in relation to the use of minimum lot size
zoning in protecting a rural community's inherent character.
Steel Hill, THREE OTHER RECENT MInwuM LOT SIZE
CASES AND "GENERAL WELFARE"
National Land & Invest. Co. v. Kohn,48 Appeal of Kit-Mar Build-
ers,4 9 and County Commissioners of Queen Anne's County v. Miles"0
are three recent leading cases in the area of minimum lot size zon-
ing dealing with rather large lot requirements. In National Land,
a four-acre requirement was held unreasonable, a three-acre re-
striction was held invalid in Kit-Mar, and a five-acre lot size re-
quirement was upheld in the case of Queen Anne's County.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in National Land, dealt with
the town's general welfare arguments in a restrictive manner. The
township urged that preserving the rural area of the community
would promote the general welfare. The court rejected this con-
tention on the basis that requiring four-acre lots would not pre-
serve the rural area; ". . . it would simply be dotted with larger
homes on larger lots."' It should be noted here that the National
47. 1 R. ADNERsON, supra note 3, at § 7.25.
48. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
49. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
50. 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967).
51. 419 Pa. at 531, 215 A.2d at 612.
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Land court was not dealing with a true rural community such as
Sanbornton, but with a four-acre lot requirement in a Philadel-
phia suburb.
The township also argued that preservation of the town's historic
old homes in open spaces would present them in the proper setting,
a goal within the ambit of promoting the "general welfare." The
National Land court, rejecting this argument on the grounds that
this would serve private rather than public interests, emphasized
that general welfare meant public welfare.
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this area are
highly desirious of keeping it the way it is, preferring, quite na-
turally, to look out upon land in its natural state rather than on
other homes. These desires, however, do not rise to the level of
public welfare. This is purely a matter of private desire which
zoning regulations may not be employed to effectuate.52
The National Land court also remarked that "the general welfare
is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be
exclusive and exclusionary." 53 If the general welfare is promoted
by preservation of the rural character of a community, then main-
taining a low density of population through exclusionary zoning is
the only way to preserve this rural character. In considering Na-
tional Land, and the other cases, the court in Steel Hill stated:
All these cases refer to an unnatural limiting of suburban ex-
pansion into towns in the path of population growth where a too
restrictive view of the general welfare was taken.54
In explaining this statement the Steel Hill court noted that in
National Land and Kit-Mar the towns were in the path of popula-
tion explosions while in Steel Hill the developer was seeking to
"create a demand" to live in the rural community of Sanbornton. 55
The language of the court in Queen Anne's County, where a five-
acre restriction was held reasonable, is relevant in this respect:
The population of Queen Anne's County is small and is not ex-
pected to increase more than 25 percent in the next ten years.56
52. Id. at 530, 215 A.2d at 611.
53. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
54. 469 F.2d at 961 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. 246 Md. at 371, 228 A.2d at 458. This case can and should be dis-
tinguished from Steel Hill in that only 6.7 percent of the county was
zoned to require five-acre minimum lot sizes while in Steel Hill over
fifty percent of the town required lots of six or more acres.
Therefore, the distinction must be made as to whether the area in-
volved is pressed with an influx of population, or an influx which is
only a possibility in the future.5" A rural community will natur-
ally attract persons to it, but this is not the influx of population
with which this distinction is meant to deal. It concerns non-me-
tropolitan areas such as in Steel Hill where there is no existing
demand for suburban expansion, and other areas where this de-
mand already exists. Nevertheless, if the general welfare of a
community is advanced by preservation of its rural character and
the enhancement of existing property values, why should the above
distinction be important? As to the general welfare of the partic-
ular community it would not be, but as to the general welfare of
the region in regard to a regional need for space it would be very
important. Thus, by excluding outsiders and thereby promoting
the community's general welfare, the town would be, in effect, im-
pairing the general welfare of the region.58 The court in Steel Hill
recognized this when it held the six-acre requirement to be only
a "legitimate stop-gap measure,"5 9 implying that when develop-
ment pressures become too great, smaller lots must be permitted.
This future conflict between the surging population and the small
communities was posed in question form by the court in National
Land as follows:
[W]hether the township can stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped
areas in search of a comfortable place to live.60
Perhaps an answer to this question was phrased in 1942 by the
court in Simon v. Needham 1 when the warning was given that
"[a] zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up
a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who
desire to live there ... ."02 It is ironic that the more the growing
population seeks these "hitherto undeveloped areas," the less com-
57. See also Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 655, 107 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1959) where a two-acre lot size re-
quirement was invalidated; at that time Fairfax County was considered to
be the fastest growing county in the United States.
58. A complete discussion of this future controversy is beyond the scope
of this comment since its purpose is limited to defining "general welfare"
as it relates to the particular community, not the general public. For ma-
terial dealing with this area see Comment, The General Public Interest v.
The Presumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question,
50 J. URBAN L. 129 (1972); Comment, Zoning-Municipal Corporations-
General Welfare as a Zoning Purpose Held to Encompass Local and Regional
Housing Needs, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 401 (1973).
59. 469 F.2d at 962.
60. 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
61. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516.
62. Id. at 565, 42 N.E.2d at 519.
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fortable a place to live they will become - assuming comfort is based
on density of population - and they will consequently be destroy-
ing the utopia they were attempting to find. Sustaining these large
lot requirements, as did the court in Steel Hill, permits a few citi-
zens to derive the benefits that flow from the peaceful, quite life
of a rural community. By invalidating the provisions and thus
permitting the rural area to be swallowed up by urban expansion
the courts are, in effect, precluding anyone from obtaining the
benefits of rural living.
In Queen Anne's County the court, recognizing general welfare
as a separate objective, made it clear that as long as the zoning
regulation related substantially to the general welfare of the com-
munity it was valid, notwithstanding that some persons may be
benefitted while others are injured.63 Even though Queen Anne's
County gave the term "general welfare" a broad interpretation, it
left the term undefined.64 In the judgment of the National Land
court, the general welfare concept was an ambiguous one and
hence a difficult standard to apply. 65 The court in Steel Hill at-
tempted to draw a clearer picture of the term when it recognized
the following concerns to be general welfare oriented: the con-
struction of new homes which would affect the ecology of the area,
increase the burdens upon fire and police protection, destroy the
scenic beauty and "[s]ignificantly change the rural character of
this small town... ."66 The promotion of safety would include
fire and police protection, while preservation of scenic beauty and
the rural character would be objectives encompassed within the
promotion of the general welfare. Steel Hill thus confirms the
earlier finding that preservation of the rural character promotes
the general welfare. It is interesting to note that Sanbornton,
like so many of these small communities that have been involved
in minimum lot size litigation, is considered to be a scenic area.67
In light of this, a proper question is: would the preservation of a
non-scenic community's character that is rural in size promote the
63. 246 Md. at 368, 228 A.2d at 457.
64. Id. at 371, 228 A.2d at 459.
65. 419 Pa. at 530, 215 A.2d at 611.
66. 469 F.2d at 961 (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., Senior v. Zoning Commission of Town of New Canaan,
146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960),
where the court sustained a four-acre restriction, recognizing that the area
involved was a rural one of natural beauty.
general welfare of its citizens? In view of the recent trend of
cases holding that aesthetic value is a valid zoning objective, 8
conceivably a rural community would have to be not only rural but
also pleasing to the eye for its preservation to be a benefit to
its inhabitants. Nonetheless, the question should be answered
in the negative for the following reason. It is conceded that pre-
serving a run-down area would not benefit anyone, but scenic
beauty is only one of the advantages of living in a rural area. Free-
dom from crime, noise, pollution and other annoyances of a high
population density area are all benefits that rural living offers.
Therefore, scenic beauty is only one (albeit an important one) of
the elements associated with the idea of a rural atmosphere pro-
moting the general welfare. Obviously a scenic rural community
will have an easier time persuading a court that preservation of
its rural character promotes the general welfare than an area
not so situated.
Related to this idea of scenic beauty and general welfare is
the fact that Sanbornton, as a resort area, derives revenue from
tourism. Its tourist industry is enhanced by the rural beauty of
the area; therefore, this is an example of economic well-being be-
ing promoted by maintaining this rural beauty and in turn pro-
moting the general welfare.
The Kit-Mar case is generally cited as an affirmation of the Na-
tional Land precedent; 69 however, Kit-Mar was a four to three
decision. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jones reasoned that a bur-
den would be placed on small communities if they were required
to meet a population that is growing faster than expected.70 This
burden would be a result of the requirement of providing more
public facilities to meet the increasing population. In view of the
limited tax resources of small communities, the burden would soon
become an unbearable one. 71 Instead of being promoted, the gen-
eral welfare of the community is being impaired by not providing
the community time to expand the public facilities in an orderly
manner.72 Large lot zoning would buy time for the community
68. See Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J.
URBAN L. 773 (1969); Comment, Aesthetic Zoning: The Creation of a New
Standard, 48 J. URBAN L. 740 (1971).
69. "The implication of our decision in National Land is that communi-
ties must deal with the problems of population growth. They may not
refuse to confront the future by adopting zoning regulations that effec-
tively restrict population to near present levels." 439 Pa. at 474, 268 A.2d
at 768.
70. Id. at 493, 268 A.2d at 778.
71. Id.
72. Cunningham, supra note 16, at 389.
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so it could effectively meet the population growth.73
CONCLUSION
The judicial uncertainty as to what "general welfare" means
will probably never be resolved. However, as it relates to mini-
mum lot size zoning, there is ample judicial agreement that rural
atmosphere (perhaps "scenic" rural atmosphere) is synonymous
with general welfare.
The Steel Hill court confirmed this as well as setting a prece-
dent that small, truly rural communities that are not located in
an area faced with a regional need for space have a right to pre-
73. There has been very little litigation in California dealing with
minimum lot size zoning. Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App.
2d 810, 304 P.2d 814 (1956), which was not a minimum lot size case, estab-
lished the principle that zoning for the general welfare alone was a valid
objective. The court in Robinson defined general welfare as the promotion
of the economic welfare, public convenience and general prosperity of the
community. 146 Cal. App. 2d at 814, 304 P.2d at 816.
In 1950, the California Supreme Court upheld 5,000 square feet as a
reasonable minimum lot size requirement in the case of Clemons v. City of
Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950). The court ruled that the
ordinance in question reasonably related to the public interests-the gen-
eral welfare of the community-to be a proper exercise of the police power.
Three years later, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, invali-
dated a 5,000 square foot restriction in Morris v. City of Los Angeles, 116
Cal. App. 2d 856, 254 P.2d 935 (1953). The Morris court refused to apply the
Clemons precedent because other lots in the area already violated the
minimum lot size requirement.
A one-acre lot size requirement was voided in Hamer v. Town of Ross,
59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963). The court based
its decision on the ground that the one-acre limitation did not reasonably
relate to the public welfare. It should be noted that the property in ques-
tion was located in a virtual sea of smaller lots. The court designated this
".... an 'island' of one-acre minimum lot size zoning in a residential ocean
of substantially less restrictive zoning." 59 Cal. 2d at 782, 382 P.2d at 379,
31 Cal. Rptr. at 339. Obviously this weighed heavily in the court's de-
termination that the minimum lot size restriction did not relate to the
public welfare.
The largest minimum lot size requirement sustained in California to
date was five acres in Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App.
2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967). In Morse the county wanted to preserve
the agricultural nature of the area as well as keep the density level of
population down in areas near the airport. The court held that the pre-
vention of urban sprawl and the curb on development in an area of ex-
cessive noise and hazards were reasonable objectives of zoning. 247 Cal.
App. 2d at 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
serve their rural atmosphere. The rural character of a community
is a valuable asset in today's environmental revolution. As
such, it should be a protectible asset, and the residents of these com-
munities have a right to preserve it, even when the means used to
achieve this end is through exclusionary zoning.
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